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The tortuously constricted boundaries within which the Vlad­
ivostok agreement can be considered as an advance toward the goal 
of arms reduction and stability remind us once again that technol­
ogy unconstrained by law inexorably limits that arena within which 
we enjoy the capacity to control our own future.
Certainly the Vladivostok agreement contains some tangible 
advances—primarily the establishment of a ceiling upon the num­
ber of all strategic-weapon delivery vehicles (long-range missiles 
and bombers). In addition, the agreement offers some short-term 
advantages to the United States. For instance, our forward-based 
systems in Europe are omitted from the strategic ceiling even 
though they could be used to strike the Soviet heartland. The 
strategic forces of the United Kingdom and France are also omit­
ted from the calculation. Unfortunately, however, restraints upon 
the qualitative arms race, including the development and deploy­
ment of MIRV systems, are almost non-existent. Both sides are 
permitted to increase their deliverable warhead capacity almost 
without limitation. More importantly, no provision is made for a 
planned and gradual diminution or elimination either of existing 
stockpiles or of obsolete and increasingly provocative systems.
The proposed agreement allows both the United States and 
the Soviet Union an upper limit of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles 
through 1985, of which 1320 may possess MIRV’s of unlimited 
size, accuracy and number. An indirect qualitative limitation may 
be said to exist insofar as the entire category of any missile tested 
with multiple warheads will be counted against the ceiling (1320) of 
vehicles possessing multiple warheads. In addition, the Soviet
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Union may deploy no more than 300 of its giant SS-9 and SS-18 
missiles. This limitation is merely a continuation of that provided 
in the 1972 accord. No prohibition was agreed upon with regard to 
land-mobile missiles or launchers. Any weapons developed within 
this latter category are included within the allowable number of 
strategic delivery vehicles; the United States has published its un­
derstanding that any deployment of such weapons systems must be 
done in the open (on railroad cars or trucks) to permit satellite 
observation.
Under the proposed agreement, the Soviet Union could by 
1985 replace 1320 of their 1410 silo-based ICBM’s (SS-9 and 
SS-11) with larger, more powerful weapons, which could be 
MIRVed without limitation. Instead of the 1410 warheads pres­
ently deployed in its land-based strategic missiles, permitted under 
SALT I, the Soviet Union could have 6,700 or more deliverable 
warheads, with accuracy and payload sufficient to present a credi­
ble first-strike threat to our land-based systems. In recognition of 
this strategic possibility, the Vladivostok agreement permits the 
United States to replace all of its first generation Minuteman III 
and Poseidon missiles with the larger, more accurate, Minuteman 
IV and Trident I missiles. Within the upper limit of 2400 strategic 
delivery vehicles and the sub-limit of 1320 which can be improved 
qualitatively without restriction, we reportedly plan to place an 
additional 288 huge Trident II missiles on 12 Trident submarines.
The immense advantage possessed by the Soviet Union in mis­
sile size and throw weight, when coupled with an agreement which 
provides a numerical ceiling upon delivery vehicles but no limita­
tion upon qualitative improvements such as MIRV, presents the 
United States with the prospect of being placed in a position of 
decisive inferiority unless one of two objectives is met. First, the 
United States can, under the Vladivostok agreement, increase the 
size and the throw weight capacity of its own land-based delivery 
systems. This course would entail another huge jump in the arms 
race and an increase in the arms budget at a time when neither is 
desirable. Second, the Vladivostok accord could be modified to 
provide for a phased reduction and eventual elimination of land- 
based missile systems. This step would have to be accom p lish ed  
before MIRV development by the Soviet Union eliminates the 
American superiority in the number of deliverable warheads, 
which superiority provides the counter-balance to Soviet throw 
weight. Before technology again outdistances diplomacy, the 
United States must quickly choose between these two courses. We 
propose that it adopt the latter.
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One of the great tragedies of our time is the degree to which 
technology has consistently undermined diplomatic and political 
attempts to place the restraints of law upon the development of 
weapons systems. Whether motivated by “worst case” analysis in 
deployment of arms, by a somewhat related “action-reaction” cycle 
between opposing states, by inter-service rivalry within a state, by 
bureaucratic adherence to a Parkinsonian law of growth, or simply 
by a failure of political leadership, we have managed since World 
War II to insure the blessings of peace for outer space,1 the ocean 
floor,2 and Antarctica3 while leaving the great powers relatively 
free from the constraints of law in the conduct of the arms race. 
We have expended our time and energies in negotiating agree­
ments to prohibit the use of armaments that are not even feasible 
for serious use,4 in proscribing the emplacement of weapons sys­
tems where we have scant evidence that anyone intended 
deployment,5 and in concluding agreements which, while posses­
sing limited value in themselves, are justified largely as being “first 
steps.”6 These steps somehow lead not to substantial constraints 
upon the principal actors but instead result in our prescribing the 
most significant prophylactic devices for those possessing greater 
continence than their physicians.7
In fairness, we did begin the attempt at nuclear arms control 
by focusing on the central problems. The Baruch Plan8 must surely
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January
27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.LA.S. No. 6347.
2. Draft Treaty with the U.S.S.R. on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of 
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, April 23, 1970, 9 I n t ’l  L. M at. 534 
(1970) [hereinafter Seabed Treaty].
3. Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 
4780; 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock­
piling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, April 10, 
1972 quoted in U n i te d  S t a t e s  Arms C o n t r o l  and  D isarm am ent Agency, U.S. 
Arms C o n t r o l  and  D isarm am ent A greem ents: 1959-1972, at 98 (1972).
5. Seabed Treaty, supra note 2.
6 . Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space 
and Under Water, August 5, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.LA.S. No. 5433.
*7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, [1970] 
21 U.S.T. 483, T.LA.S. No. 6839. See also Firmage, The Treaty on the Non­
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 Am. J. I n t ' l  L. 7 11 (1969).
8- See Firmage, Anarchy or Order? The Nth Country Problem and the International 
Rule of Law, 29 Mo. L. Rev. 138, 142-44 (1964).
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represent one of the most creative efforts ever made to control 
weapons technology. That plan foundered for many reasons. One 
of the most immediate of these reasons, but not necessarily the 
most fundamental, was an insistence upon a level of intrusive in­
spection and enforcement unacceptable to any state.9
After technology, in the form of our successive loss of nuclear 
and then thermonuclear monopoly, had foreclosed any possible 
success of the Baruch Plan later attempts at “general and com­
plete” disarmament foundered upon the issue of adversary or 
third party on-site inspection.10 When President Eisenhower in his 
farewell address warned against the “military-industrial complex,” 
he identified his inability to accomplish effective disarmament as 
the single most significant failure of his tenure in office.11 He had 
exculpatory reasons which are not possessed by his successors, for 
technology, in addition to providing crushing problems in the form 
of new armaments, has also given heretofore nonexistent means 
for verifying compliance. The indictment of successor administra­
tions must therefore include not only the lack of imaginative pro­
posals for the control of nuclear weapons technology but also the 
failure to provide even the most cautious, conservative up-dating 
of an agreement to take note of increased technological capacity 
for verification by national means.12
Benjamin Franklin wrote Josiah Quincy that “there was never 
a good war or a bad peace.” 13 It would be inappropriate to attempt 
to apply this aphorism to arms control agreements, for a badly 
conceived agreement could result in seriously increased instability 
or even war. However, we have erred overwhelmingly in the direc­
tion of caution. Abram Chayes has convincingly demonstrated that 
our preoccupation with technical factors, particularly our quest for 
foolproof systems of adversarial or third party on-site verification,
9. Id.
10. Id. See also, B. B e ch h o e fe r ,  P o s tw a r  N e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  Arms C o n t r o l  
(1961).
11. Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's Farewell to the Nation, 44 Dep’t  S ta te  
B u l l .  181 (1961).
12. The Canadian effort to update the Non-Proliferation treaty by introducing 
a limitation on the number and power of nuclear tests has met with consistent 
opposition by both the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. Arms C t l  
D isarm am ent Agency, D ocum ents  on D isarm am ent 1971, at 814, 852 (1970).
At the June 1974 summit, the Soviet Union proposed a complete test ban, but 
the United States turned it down on the grounds that it was unverifiable and 
contained objectionable escape clauses. Wash. Post, July 4, 1974, at 6, col. 6.
13. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Josiah Quincy, September 11, 1773 
quoted in C. Van Doren, Benjamin F ra n k l in ,  at 698 (1938).
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has resulted in a catastrophic loss of security. Clearly the risks of 
competing arms technologies which threaten to become absolutely 
unmanageable in the foreseeable future outweigh the dangers im­
plicit in an arms control agreement which possesses less than com­
plete adversarial inspection provisions.14
As Chayes rightly noted, formidable internal political and 
bureaucratic barriers against cheating exist within a state, even 
without an agreement providing for adversarial third-party verifi­
cation. We would emphasize in addition the substantial areas of 
possible agreement where national means of verification already 
exist.
Chayes asserts that substantial domestic political and bureau­
cratic impediments lie in the path of a preconceived plan for com­
mitting violations of an arms control treaty and that these factors, 
more than technical factors relating to verification, provide the 
seminal bulwark against treaty violation. But this is not to say that 
the technical factors are not of the highest importance. Indeed, in 
the absence of third party or adversarial on-site inspection, ade­
quate national technical means of detection must be part of the 
(unstated) basis of the Chayes position, for the information sup­
plied by such means must antedate the development of domestic 
forces in opposition to treaty violations. Without the existence of 
technical factors which enable national means of verification, much 
of the force of the Chayes position disappears.
The penchant for internal security and secrecy which con­
stitutes a strategic asset and a basic tenet of political and social 
life in the Soviet bloc must be assessed with a view toward the rel­
ative openness of Western societies in calculating the potential 
balance achieved through “self-enforcing provisions” in arms con­
trol agreements. If agreements are to be accomplished which bind 
the super-powers and do not simply affect lesser states—and if 
those agreements are to affect the most potent strategic weapons 
systems in the arsenals of those great states and the technology to 
develop or improve such systems—then the consequences of treaty 
violation are obviously immense. Within this context, technical 
factors involving verification become vital. To avoid the repeti­
tion of past impasses over the issue of intrusive inspection, the 
United States should pursue agreements which fully exploit the 
present technical capacity for national means of verification.
SALT I and II are here analyzed within this context of seeking
14. Chayes, An Inquiry Into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 Hary\ L. 
Rev. 905 (1972).
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arrangements (a) which bind the superpowers (b) in the develop­
ment and deployment of their most powerful strategic weapons (c) 
in such a manner that verification can be accomplished by national 
means. In general our proposals seek to enhance nuclear stability 
while preserving options for nuclear response. The central pro­
posal is developed following suggestions outlined earlier by Ber­
nard Feld and others,15 and is directed toward reducing the threat 
to stability posed by MIRV and other qualitative developments. 
The proposals dealing with MIRV have two major objectives: first, 
to reduce MIRV’s pace of development and, second, to diminish 
its long-term threat. The first objective would be accomplished by 
imposing a missile test limitation on tests of all types while simulta­
neously introducing a planned freeze on launch vehicle size in­
creases. The second objective is achieved by a phased reduction 
and the eventual elimination of land-based ICBM’s while increas­
ing allowable numbers of SLBM submarines. Full development of 
the United States B-l bomber and Trident submarine programs 
is also advocated.
An additional category of proposals is directed toward preserv­
ing SLBM submarine invulnerability. It is proposed that no limita­
tion be established on submarine or SLBM range in order to in­
crease for both sides the effective “on station” area in the ocean for 
both sides. Other means are proposed to prevent or retard the 
development of antisubmarine warfare activity of the type which 
could potentially threaten SLBM submarines. Collateral discussion 
is directed toward a post-launch missile destruct mechanism and 
toward the control of tactical nuclear weapons.
II. T he SALT I Agreements
Because of the enormity of the disparity between technological 
capability and the political capacity to regulate that capability,16 it is
15. See notes 117, 121, 126 infra.
16. Rhinelander, An Overview of Salt /, 67 Am. J. I n t ’l  L., No. 5, P roceedings 
o f  t h e  6 7 th  Ann. M eeting, at 29 (1973). John B. Rhinelander has asserted that 
in the U.S. decision-making process SALT I constituted 60% technology and 40% 
politics; c.f, Chayes, supra note 14.
Technically oriented literature of significance to the issues at SALT includes: 
W. Biddle, Weapons T e c h n o lo g y  and  Arms C o n t r o l  (1972); R. Kuenne, The 
P o la r is  Missile S t r ik e  (1966); J. N eilands ,  e t  al .,  H a r v e s t  o f  D e a th  (1972); 
Feld, ASW—The ABM of the 1970's? 7 S t a n f o r d  J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
S tud ies  87 (1972); Garwin, Antisubmarine Warfare and National Security, Scientif ic  
American, July 1972, 14; Greenwood, Reconnaissance, Suiueillance and Arms 
Control, A delphi Papers, No. 88 (1972); Greenwood, Reconnaissance and Arms
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remarkable that an agreement was reached at SALT I. The accords 
are, to be sure, seriously deficient; but analysis of those deficiencies 
serves to illuminate both the goals yet to be reached and the obsta­
cles to be overcome.
There are four major agreements comprising SALT I: the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM 
Treaty) ,17 the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Of­
fensive Arms (Interim Agreement),18 the Agreement on Nuclear 
Accidents Measures (Accidents Agreement),19 and the Agreement 
on Direct Communications Link (Hot Line Agreement).20 The 
Accident Measures Agreement and the Hot Line Agreement were 
executed on September 30, 1971, in Washington. The apparent
Control, S c ien t i f ic  American, February 1972, at 14; Imai, Nuclear Safeguards, 
Adelphi Papers, No. 86 (1972); Luttwak, The Strategic Balance 1972 , T h e  
W ash in g to n  Papers, No. 3 (1972); Myers, Extending the Nuclear Test Ban , 
Scien tif ic  American, January 1972, at 13; Scoville, et al., Issues in Arms 
Limitations— 4 Views, 8 Science and  P ub lic  A ffairs :  B u l l e t i n  o f  t h e  A tom ic 
S cien tis ts ,  9 (March 1972); Smart, Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide, 
Adelphi Papers, No. 63 (1969); York, Controlling the Qualitative Arms Race, 29 
Science an d  P ub lic  A ffa irs :  B u l l e t i n  o f  t h e  A tom ic S c ie n t is ts ,  4 (March, 
1973).
Major literature directed toward SALT includes: M. Kaplan, S a l t :  P roblem s 
and P ro sp e c ts  (1973); W. K itn e r ,  e t  a l .,  (eds.) S a l t :  Im p lica t ions  f o r  Arms 
C o n t r o l  in t h e  1970’s (1971); J. Newhouse, C o ld  Dawn, T h e  S to r y  o f  S a l t
(1973); H. S cov il le ,  T o w a r d  a S t r a t e g i c  Arms L im ita t io n  A greem en t  (1970); 
Caldwell, Soviet Attitudes to SA L T , A delph i Papers, No. 75 (1971); Calogero, A 
Scenario for Effective SALT Negotiations, 29 Science an d  Public  Affairs :  B u l l e t i n  
of t h e  A tom ic S c ie n t is ts ,  16 (June 1973); Coffey, The Savor of SALT, 29 Science 
and Public  A ffairs :  B u l l e t i n  o f  t h e  A tom ic S c ie n t is t s ,  9; (May 1973); Green­
wood and Nacht, The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense, 52 Fore ign  A ffa i rs  
761 (1974); International Institute for Strategic Studies, S t r a t e g i c  Survey 1973;
(1974).
Political ramifications of arms control are discussed in Gelber, Nuclear Weapons 
and Chinese Policy, A delphi Papers, N o . 99 (1973); Heisenberg, The Alliance and 
Europe, Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons, A delphi Papers, N o . 
96 (1973); W. Mallison, The Laws o f War and the Judicial Control of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 308 (1967); Slocombe, The Political Implications 
oj Strategic Parity, A delphi Papers, N o . 77 (1971).
17. Treaty with the U.S.S.R. on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, 
May 26, 1972, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
18. Interim Agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Certain Measures with Respect 
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 
3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504.
19. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War Outbreak, 
September 30, 1971, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186.
20. Agreement With the U.S.S.R. on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR 
Direct Communications Link. Id. at 1598; T.I.A.S. No. 7187.
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purpose in executing the two agreements prior to the time of 
serious negotiations on ABM or offensive systems was to provide 
a core of agreed values and to avoid the possibility that SALT 
might prove fruitless.21 The remarks of Secretary Rogers and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko22 at the signing ceremony indicated 
that a relatively high political value was placed on these two less 
significant agreements. Substantively, the Accidents Agreement 
and the Hot Line Agreement do establish obligations which should 
at least marginally reduce the risk of nuclear war.23
The Accidents Agreement enunciates four major obligations: 
(1) a pledge to take steps to guard against accidental or unau­
thorized use of nuclear weapons;24 (2) a pledge to notify the other 
party immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized, or 
unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear 
weapon where such detonation could create a risk of nuclear war;25 
(3) a pledge to notify the other party upon detection of uniden­
tified objects by missile detection systems or of signs of interference 
with the operation of such systems;26 and (4) a pledge to notify the 
other party of planned missile launches which extend beyond the 
national territory.27
The Hot Line Agreement expanded upon the Memorandum 
of Understanding of June 20, 1963,28 which originally established 
the Washington-Moscow “hot line.” The agreement provides two 
additional satellite links and a system of dispersed ground termi­
nals.29 The annexed technical memorandum30 indicates that the 
two alternate systems will employ the Intelsat and Molniya II satel­
lites in the transmission links. The Washington-Moscow hot line
21. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreements to Reduce Risk of Nuclear War 65 Dep’t  
S tate . B u l l .  399, (1971), note particularly remarks by Secretary Rogers and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko.
22. Id.
23. The two agreements executed at Washington on September 30, 1971 were 
negotiated and signed as a set under the label “Agreements to Reduce the Risk of 
Nuclear War” (supra, notes 19 and 20).
24. Agreement on Nuclear Accidents Measures, Article 1, supra, note 19 at 
1591.
25. Id. Article 2.
26. Id. Article 3.
27. Id. Article 4.
28. Memorandum of Understanding With the U.S.S.R. Regarding the Estab­
lishment of a Direct Communications Link, June 20, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 82d, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5362.
29. Agreement on Direct Communications Link, Article 1, supra note 20.
30. Annexed Technical Memorandum, supra note 20 at 1601.
rhas proven to be a tool of some value and the Hot Line Agreement 
will serve to protect the technical quality and integrity of the link.
The end of SALT I was marked on May 26, 1972, by the 
signing in Moscow of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)31 and the Interim Agreement on 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.32 The ABM Treaty is the 
most significant of the four agreements concluded during SALT 
I .33 It is generally believed that the long-term significance of the 
ABM Treaty lies in its potential for breaking the action-reaction 
cycle in the world of strategic arms by reducing the incentive to 
increase offensive arsenals.34 In the ABM Treaty both nuclear 
powers have officially recognized and in effect agreed to maintain 
mutual deterrence.35
The ABM Treaty allows two protectable geographic regions 
within the national territory of each party.36 One region comprises 
an area within 150 kilometers (94 miles) of the national capital, the 
second encompasses territory within 150 kilometers of ICBM silo 
launchers.37 A problem was encountered during the course of 
negotiations with respect to the permissible relative location of the 
two ABM sites. The United States viewed as non-negotiable the 
premise that the Soviet Union would not be allowed to locate both 
of its ABM sites in Western Russia near the SS-11 fields and Mos­
cow, where the sites would overlap to provide substantial area 
defense.38 Ultimately an Agreed Interpretation39 was reached re­
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31. Supra, note 17.
32. Supra, note 18.
33. See Statement by the Honorable William P. Rogers to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Paragraph VI. Dep’t State News Release, at 3 (June 20, 
1972).
34. Id. at 4, see also 67 Am. J. Int’l L., supra note 16 at 31.
35. Rogers statement, supra note 33.
36. At the Moscow summit of June 1974, President Nixon and Soviet Com­
munist Party Chairman Brezhnev signed a protocol limiting each party to one 
ABM site rather than the two sites provided in the treaty. Additionally, at the 
Moscow summit, agreement was reached prohibiting underground nuclear tests 
exceeding 50 kilotons. The agreement excludes peaceful engineering applications. 
The parties also agreed "in principle” to permit on-site inspection for the conduct 
of the peaceful explosions.
Two unpublished protocols specify certain procedures and alterations in the 
dismantling and replacement of missiles under the 1972 Interim Agreement. Sec­
retary Kissinger has stated that the two secret protocols "break no new ground.” 
(See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1974, at 1, col. 8)
37. ABM Treaty, Article III, supra note 17 at 3440.
38. J. Newhouse, C o ld  Dawn: T h e  S to r y  o f  SALT 233 (1973).
39. Agreed Interpretations (C), supra, note 17 at 3456.
quiring the two sites to be separated by at least 1300 kilometers 
(800 miles). The 1300 kilometer limit operates to position the 
U.S.S.R. ICBM-protective site east of the Ural Mountains near the 
lesser populated regions of SS-9 deployment.40
Additionally, the treaty restricts the technical parameters at 
each ABM deployment location. Each site may employ no more 
than 100 ABM launchers with no more than 100 ABM interceptor 
missiles at launch sites. Nor more than six ABM radar complexes, 
each having a circular diametral dimension of no more than three 
kilometers, may be deployed at the “national capital” site, while two 
large phased-array ABM radars, in addition to eighteen standard 
ABM radars of limited power, may be utilized at the ICBM- 
protective site.41
The ABM Treaty also contains a provision in article IV which 
allows the continued use of test areas, provided that no more than 
fifteen launchers are employed. On April 26, 1972, the United 
States Delegation issued a statement of common understanding 
locating the United States ABM test ranges at White Sands, New 
Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll and the U.S.S.R. range near Sary 
Shagan in Kazakhstan. On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Union con­
curred in the United States’ statement.42
Several provisions in the ABM Treaty reflect attempts to limit 
the further development of ABM technology. The parties pledged 
to refrain from developing, testing, or deploying ABM systems or 
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile 
land-based.43 In addition, agreement was reached preventing the 
development, testing, or deployment of multiple ABM missile 
launchers or rapid re-load ABM launchers.44 Other provisions de­
signed to maintain the commitment to deterrence include a ban on 
developing ABM capabilities in present defensive and strategic 
force components; a ban on testing such force components in an 
ABM mode, lest SAM missile installations be upgraded to an ABM 
level;45 a prohibition against future deployment of radar for early 
warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along 
the periphery of the national borders and oriented outward;46 and
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40. Supra, note 38 at 248. , ,
41. Supra, note 37.
42. Common Understanding (B), supra note 17 at 3458.
43. ABM Treaty, Article V, supra note 17 at 3441.
44. Id. <
45. ABM Treaty, Article VI, supra note 17 at 3442.
46. Id.
a pledge to refrain from transferring ABM systems or components 
to other states and to forbear deployment beyond the national 
territory.47 Modernization and replacement of ABM systems is 
permitted within the scope of the technical restrictions on all ABM 
systems.48
Both parties recognized the political-diplomatic thicket sur­
rounding verification in arms control agreements. Accordingly, the 
ABM Treaty adopts a fall-back position by relying upon “national 
technical means”49 rather than high-level over-flight or on-site in­
spection mechanisms. The conjunction of the high level of confi­
dence in “national means” with the nature of the terms serves to 
make the ABM Treaty generally verifiable. The verification ar­
ticle, article XII, provides other requirements for enhancing the 
reliability of “national technical means.” One such requirement is 
non-interference with properly recognized verification proce­
dures; another is the prohibition against deliberate concealment 
resulting in the impairment of the verification process.00
Control of the types of radar systems that could be used as 
components in an ABM system presented a time-consuming and 
vexing issue in the course of the ABM negotiations.51 One of the 
substantial problems inherent in reliance upon “national technical 
means” of verification is the possible clandestine development of 
such a system, followed by denunciation of the treaty and rapid 
deployment. Since existing radar systems of the phased-array con­
figuration are very large52 and would be practically impossible to 
hide, and since the radar system would require a greater lead 
time in deployment than other ABM components,53 radar has been 
selected as the pressure point control of clandestine ABM deploy­
ment.
The treaty also prohibits employment of non-ABM, long- 
range radar systems at geographic locations where—by effectively 
reducing the lead time for the deployment of secretly developed
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47. ABM Treaty, Article IX, supra note 17 at 3443.
48. ABM Treaty, Article VII, supra note 17 at 3442.
49. ABM Treaty, Article XII, supra note 17 at 3443.
50. Id.
51. U.S. Arms C o n t r o l  and  D isa rm am ent Agency, 1 2 th  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  t o  
the Congress ,  at 3 (1972).
52. The presently deployed phased-array, perimeter acquisition radar located 
near Grand Forks, North Dakota, is housed in a structure about 200 feet square 
and 130 feet tall. Supra, note 38 at 153.
53. Supra, note 51.
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ABM systems—such radar systems may be used, functionally, as 
ABM components.54 As an additional impediment to technological 
upgrading of radar capabilities employed in the ABM systems, the 
Agreed Interpretations prescribe limits on radar potential.55
During the course of negotiation and determination of ad­
ministration policy, “exotic” ABM systems became a growing con­
cern. “Exotics” were considered to be presently unknown anti- 
ballistic missile systems which did not employ a strike missile: For 
example, mechanisms such as lasers, charged particles, or elec­
tromagnetic weaves.56 On July 2, 1971, a complete ban on “exotics” 
was proposed in U.S. National Security Decision Memorandum 
Number 117 wrhich specified that everything not allowred in a 
SALT agreement was forbidden.57 The United States proposal was 
not well-received. Ultimately the two parties at SALT issued 
Agreed Interpretation (E),58 which delays consideration of “ex­
otics” until they are actually potential substitutes for existing sys­
tems and then refers the matter to the Standing Consultative 
Commission established under article XIII of the treaty.
Beyond the recognition of the importance and validity of 
mutual deterrence as a strategic policy, the ABM Treaty has 
codified deterrence by barring measures wrhich could give either 
side the capacity to protect its industry and its population against 
nuclear attack, or which could arouse concern that either party was 
attempting to develop such a capacity.59 ?
The Interim Agreement executed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, 
has proven to be the most controversial of the SALT I accords. 
Unlike the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement is limited in dura­
tion and scope and does not provide a long-term comprehensive 
limitation on strategic offensive weapons systems. It is a “holding” 
device to prevent the number of ICBM and SLBM launchcrs from 
increasing while negotiation to limit offensive systems continues.
54. Supra, note 45.
55. Radar potential is defined as the product of the mean emitted power in 
watts and the antenna area in square meters. Agreed Interpretation (B) limits the 
18 smaller ABM radars at the ICBM site to a potential less than 3 million watt­
meters squared. Agreed Interpretation (B), supra note 17 at 3456.
56. Supra, note 23, also, 34 Electronics 81 (1961), where a laser destruct 
system is examined.
57. Supra, note 38, at 230. • • • •
58. Agreed Interpretation (E), supra note 17.
59. J. Coffey, The Savor of SALT, Science and Public Affairs: Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 9 (May, 1973). ,
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Although it constrains a number of Soviet programs, it, in fact, has 
no such effect upon United States programs.60
The Interim Agreement prohibits construction of additional 
fixed, land-based ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972,61 thereby 
limiting the United States to a maximum of 1054 such launchers 
and the U.S.S.R. to a maximum of 1618.62 The quantitative limit of 
Article I is further complemented by a qualitative restriction in 
Article II, which prohibits the conversion of “light” ICBM launch­
ers, or launchers deployed prior to 1964, into “heavy” ICBM 
launchers.63 After several months of negotiation, the United States 
could not persuade the U.S.S.R. to accept a common definition for 
“light” and “heavy” ICBM’s. The Soviets argued that the agree­
ment was only a short-term freeze and that both sides could distin­
guish “light” and “heavy” rather easily.64 Both sides appeared to 
have reached an understanding that Soviet SS-11 and SS-13 sys­
tems are “light”, while SS-8’s, SS-7’s, and SS-9’s are “heavy.” Like­
wise, American Titans are “heavy” while Minuteman systems are 
“light.”65
On April 7, 1972, after being frustrated in attempts to achieve 
a specific definition of “heavy missiles,” the United States issued 
Unilateral Statement (D) which defined a “heavy ICBM” to be any 
missile having a volume significantly greater than the largest “light” 
ICBM” then operational on either side. It has been revealed that 
the United States notified the Soviet Union that it considered a 
“heavy” missile to be one exceeding a volume of seventy cubic 
meters, the SS-11 measuring sixty-nine cubic meters.66
60. Testimony of Gerard Smith, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis­
armament Agency before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 28, 
1972, Current Foreign Policy, Dep’t  State Publication 8668, General Foreign 
Policy Series 266, at 4 (1972).
61. Interim Agreement, Article I, supra note 18 at 3464.
62. Congressional Briefing by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 118 Cong. Rec. at 
21309 (1972).
63. Interim Agreement, Article 2, supra note 18 at 3464.
64. Supra, note 60.
65. Id.
66 . Unilateral Statement (D), supra note 18. In August 1975 a great deal of 
official United States comment centered upon the substitution by the Soviet Union 
of a new SS-I9 missile for some older SS-11 models. Based upon intelligence 
reports, it appears that the new SS-19 is approximately 50% larger than the SS-11 
and can lift off approximately 7,500 pounds as opposed to 2,500 pounds for the 
SS-11, thereby accomodating a substantially larger nuclear payload. The new de­
velopment raised serious questions regarding the utility and advisability of the use
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The Interim Agreement also limits submarine launched 
ballistic missiles and launchers to the number operational or under 
construction on May 26, 1972 (the date of signature).67 However, 
the right to modernize and replace older submarines and SLBM 
missiles with newer types is retained. A protocol to the interim 
agreement specifically sets the maximum numbers of SLBM’s and 
submarines at 710 and 44, respectively, for the United States and 
950 and 62, respectively, for the Soviet Union.68 At the time of 
agreement, however, the United States had 656 SLBM launchers 
on operational submarines or submarines under construction 
and the Soviet Union had 740. Accordingly, under the protocol 
each party may substitute SLBM’s for land-based ICBM’s which 
were deployed prior to 1964, up to the prescribed maximums of 
710 and 950 SLBM’s, and reduce the quotas established for 
ICBM’s.69
The ICBM substitution clause of the protocol would allow the 
United States to substitute modern SLBM’s for its 54 Titan II 
ICBM’s and a number of its pre-1964 Minuteman I missiles, in 
order to reach a maximum of 710 SLBM launchers. Likewise, the 
Soviet Union could choose to substitute modern SLBM launchers 
for the 66 launchers now employed in diesel-powered submarines 
and pre-1964 SS-7 and SS-8 launchers, in order to achieve a max­
imum of 950 modern SLBM launchers.70
of “unilateral statements” in SALT negotiations. In addition, the SS-19 deploy­
ment invited some charges of breach of the SALT I accord in the Congress. Int’l 
Herald Trib. (Paris), Aug. 7, 1975, at 3, col. 6.
On January 14, 1975, at a news conference, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
stated that evidence existed of the beginning of deployment of MIRV by the Soviet 
Union with the largest new missile, the SS-18. Wash. Post, January 15, 1975, at 1, 
col. 1.
67. Interim Agreement, Article III, supra note 18 at 3464.
6 8 . Protocol to the Interim Agreement, supra note 18 at 3469.
69. Id.
70. The International Institute For Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance, 1972-73 at 84 (1972).
Just prior to the Moscow summit of June 1974, concern arose over two allegedly 
secret agreements which were not presented to the Congress. It was asserted that 
Secretary Kissinger had agreed to forego the option of transition from land-based 
Titan II missiles to modern SLBM launchers. Additionally, Senator Jackson 
claimed that the Secretary had agreed that transition missiles would not be in­
cluded in the total number of allowable SLBM launchers, thereby increasing the 
total allowable Soviet SLBM launchers to 1020 instead of 950. (See N.Y. Times, 
June 22, 1974, at 1, col.l). Secretary Kissinger, however, denied that the agree­
ments were made and stated that both issues were discussed subsequent to con­
An Agreed Interpretation was reached which does not allow 
significant increases in silo dimensions in the event the silo is 
“modernized.” 71 On May 26, 1972, the parties issued a Com­
mon Understanding defining “significantly increased” to mean 
no greater than 10-15 percent notably without reference to the 
identity of the dimensions (i.e., depth, diameter, etc.).72
Other articles regarding verification and the Standing Consul­
tative Commission closely parallel those of the ABM Treaty.73 Arti­
cle VII indicates the intent of the parties to continue negotiations 
and states that the Interim Agreement is not to be interpreted to 
limit the scope or terms of any subsequent offensive weapons 
agreement.74 Article VIII provides a durational limit of five years 
for the agreement and also includes an “extraordinary events” 
withdrawal clause now relatively common in arms control 
agreements.75
III. Political Aspects of SALT II
The signing of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement 
on May 26, 1972, marked the beginning of a vociferous and multi­
faceted debate over whether the United States had “won” or “lost” 
at the bargaining table. The key words in the highly speculative 
debate surrounding SALT are “parity” and “sufficiency.”
The major camps on both sides of the debate share the basic 
premise that the United States must maintain a level of military 
strength which will preserve its position as the preeminent politi­
cal power of the Western world. However, beyond that founda­
tion, there is little common ground. The meaning of “sufficiency” 
is complicated by a double definition in popular usage. In its nar­
row, military sense, sufficiency means the minimum level of mili­
tary strength sufficient to deter an attack. In a broader, more
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gressional approval of the interim agreement, but that no change was made in the 
allowable numbers of missiles. He termed a statement he had made regarding 
Titan II’s as a “prediction” that the United States would not replace them with 
SLBM’s. (See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1974, at 1, col. 3).
71. Agreed Interpretation (C), supra note 18, at 3478.
72. Common Understanding (A), supra note 18, at 3479.
73. Interim Agreement, Articles V and VI, supra note 18, at 3465, 3466.
74. Interim Agreement, Article VII, supra note 18, at 3466.
75. Interim Agreement, Article VIII, jMjfna note 18, at 3467. See Firmage, The 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 711, 739 
(1969) regarding the withdrawal term.
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political sense, sufficiency means the level of military strength nec­
essary to prevent the United States from being coerced. This po­
litical definition may involve a higher standard than mere deter­
rence. Both definitions, however, encompass the retention of a 
sufficient, second-strike force after an initial cataclysmic attack. 
Neither definition permits the mere balancing of numeric criteria 
isolated from such offsetting factors as geography, hardening, 
civil defense, reconnaissance, and economics. The fact that SALT 
I, in the ABM Treaty, codified the concept of deterrence is a per­
suasive indication that the Nixon Administration believed that 
strategic “sufficiency” exists, at least in the military sense. Whether 
“sufficiency” exists in the political sense is open to speculation. 
Despite the conflicting results of detailed calculations, one may 
conclude, at the very least, that neither superpower can consider 
itself to have any significant advantage over the other in terms of 
ability to engage in nuclear war free from the threat of substantial 
retaliation.76
The “parity” camp first takes issue with the claim that mini­
mum deterrent sufficiency exists in the SALT I formula, partic­
ularly when control is not maintained over modernization and 
MIRV deployment. In addition, the “parity” philosophy empha­
sizes the political importance of visible equality independent of 
amorphous technical explanations to prove sufficiency or tech­
nical equality.77 In advancing the case for parity, a hypothetical 
situation is often established wherein the Soviet Union gains 
qualitative and quantitative superiority and launches a preemp­
tive attack upon the United States, destroying all land-based 
missiles and most Polaris submarines. At that point, it is argued, 
the Soviet Union would be in a position to blackmail the United 
States into submission.78
Although most of the “parity” supporters concede that the 
reasonable decision-maker would not risk the kind of action set 
forth in the preceding hypothetical, the argument seems always to 
shift to one centered upon the value of the appearance of power 
through numerical equality. One writer has alluded to the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962 and inferred that the result would have been 
different had the United States possessed fewer nuclear ICBM
76. Supra, note 70, at 86.
77. Rhinelander supra note 16, at 39> Perle, “Mutually Assured Destruction 
as a Strategic Policy.”
78. Id. ' \
1975] VLADIVOSTOK AND BEYOND 237
delivery vehicles than the Soviet Union.79 However, an equally 
convincing case can be made for the assertion that the Soviets felt 
compelled to take the precarious step of emplacing MRBM’s and 
IRBM’s in Cuba, even though this action broke their long-standing 
tradition of locating no such weapons outside the Soviet Union, 
precisely because of the rapid American build-up of ICBM’s fol­
lowing the “missile gap” scare of the 1960 Presidential elections. It 
may also be argued that the Cuban missile crisis ended as it did 
because the United States possessed an overwhelming superiority 
in locally deployed conventional forces.80 Perhaps the most con­
vincing element in the “parity” position is the assertion that 
through numeric equality the United States may simply and clearly 
demonstrate to a world populace not sophisticated in deterrence 
strategy that the United States is at least as powerful as any other 
nation.
To assess adequately the overall balance set forth in the five- 
year Interim Agreement, it is necessary to attribute some weight 
to forces not included in the agreement, such as American bomber 
forces and European forward-based systems. The qualitative fac­
tors of MIRV and accuracy must also be considered. The United 
States still maintains a two-to-one lead in deliverable war heads and 
a major lead in accuracy.81 Additionally, deployment requirements 
must be considered. As a result of geography and other factors ex­
isting during the period of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet 
Union must deploy three submarines for every two deployed by 
the United States in order to have the same number on station.82 
Because of the greater distance from Soviet bases to patrol stations 
and the shorter range of Soviet SLBM’s only about 40 percent of 
Soviet SLBM’s can be in firing position at any time compared with 
60 percent of the American SLBM’s. It should also be recognized
79. W. Kitner, “Arms Control for a Five-Power World,” SALT Implications fo r  
Arms Control in the 1970*s, (1973) at 176.
80. E. Able, The Missile Crisis (1966); R. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (1969); cf. G. 
Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971).
81. Kissinger, supra note 62, at 21310. At the June 1974 Moscow Summit, no 
agreement could be reached on limiting both quantity and quality of missile de­
ployment because there was no mutually agreeable parameter for exercising the 
control. The Soviet Union would prefer to control the number of warheads while 
the United States wishes strictly to limit the number of launch vehicles. The 
proposed number of vehicles was wholly unacceptable to the Soviet Union. (N.Y. 
Times, July 5, 1974, at 1, col.8).
82. Supra note 62, at 21310.
that the Soviet MIRV program is still somewhat behind that of the 
United States. Even if the Soviet Union builds the maximum allow­
able SLBM force during the five-year life of the Interim Agree­
ment, it will still be able to fire fewer warheads than the United 
States.83 Of course, a radically different situation would exist once 
a full-scale MIRV deployment of the Soviet SLBM force were ac­
complished.
Deliverable megatonage is also a widely discussed, but mislead­
ing, statistic used in analyzing the “balance” under the Interim 
Agreement. It is generally agreed that the deliverable ICBM and 
SLBM megatonage of Soviet forces is about 11,400 MT whereas 
that of the United States is 2,400 MT. An even larger, though 
reverse, disparity is observed in the area of long-range bombers 
(U.S.S.R.: 3,600 MT, U.S.: 16,500 MT).84 Mere deliverable 
megatonage is a deceiving factor unless accuracy is also taken into 
account. A widely recognized formula illustrating the important 
interrelationship between yield and accuracy is:
2  (yield) 2^ 3
; ■■■ (CEP)2 , . . •
where K is a measure of first-strike destructive capability and CEP 
the circular error probability (accuracy), which represents the 
radius of a circle centered on the target so that a wrarhead aimed at 
the target would have equal chances of falling inside or outside of 
the circle.85 ' ,
It is important to recognize that in determining the first-strike 
capability, a multiplication of yield by 2 will increase capability by a 
factor of 1.6, or 60 percent. However, an increase in accuracy by a 
factor of 2 (therefore a decrease in CEP of 1/2) will increase capa­
bility by a factor of 4, or 300 percent.86 In the final analysis, it is 
important not to overreact to the impression created by a simple 
comparison of megatonnage. The Soviet lead in this area is much
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83. Supra note 70, at 85. See also, supra note 59, at 9, where the assertion is 
made that it is conceivable that the Soviet Union could install enough MIRV’s to 
surpass the United States in numbers of warheads by 1977 or sometime thereaf­
ter. At a news conference on January 14, 1975, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
stated that there is evidence that the Soviet Union has actually deployed MIRV, 
with the largest new missile, the SS-18. Washington Post, January 15, 1975, at 1, 
col. 1.
84. Supra note 70, at 85.
85. W. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control at 144 (1972).
86 . Id. '
less significant when it is analyzed in light of the substantial advan­
tage possessed by the United States in terms of targeting, accuracy, 
and MIRV deployment.
Still another important factor in determining the most desira­
ble balance is the nature of an anticipated conflict. Those who 
support “sufficiency” in the military sense are actually speaking of 
a minimum deterrent force capable of surviving a first strike and 
inflicting on the opposition something at least slightly more than 
marginally acceptable damage on the opposition.87 With the recent 
development in United States strategic policy of “flexible 
response,”88 more than just minimum deterrent sufficiency would 
be required to assure both the capacity for surgical, tactical use of 
weapons systems and the retention of the survivable, second strike 
force levels. In fact, the second, political meaning of “sufficiency” 
has been the meaning applied most often in describing a standard 
for flexible response. In addition, a buffer quantity above the 
minimum necessary level of military strength is desirable to insure 
that a surprise technological advance by the other side will not 
bring the balance below the point of “sufficiency” under either 
definition.
Even if the Interim Agreement did not provide answers to the 
questions surrounding the establishment of a “minimum stable 
deterrent,” 89 it did give both parties an opportunity to reflect upon 
the subject by allowing the possibility of a short respite from the 
quantitative arms race. Immediately prior to the Interim Agree­
ment, the Soviet Union was producing SLBM launchers at the rate 
of about 128 per year and had demonstrated the capability of 
building ICBM’s at a rate of 250 per year. At those rates, in five 
years the Soviets would have had 1200 SLBM launchers and nearly 
2,800 ICBM’s, many more than are now permitted. The United 
States has no active program to expand its numbers of launchers 
by 1978; and, in the aftermath of our involvement in Vietnam and 
the consequent attitude among the public and the Congress toward 
military spending, there seems to be little likelihood of a dramatic 
change in the near future. It can at least be argued that the In­
terim Agreement has temporarily reduced the potential 1978
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87. Id. at 241-42.
88 . Statement by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in the annual 
report of the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1975, released in March 
1974. The new “flexible response” doctrine is proposed in order to give the 
President “a wider set of much more selective targeting options."
89. Supra, note 85, at 242.
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Soviet launcher totals until a more desirable, permanent solution 
is reached.90
Two important developments have occurred—one in technol­
ogy, the other in strategic policy—which should be discussed prior 
to setting out proposals for SALT II. The first major development 
was the successful test firing of a Soviet SS-19 MIRV system on 
January 25 and 26, 197491 and deployment which began in early 
1975.92
Second, on January 10, 1974, Defense Secretary Schlesinger 
announced that “there has been . . .  a change in the strategies of 
the U.S. with regard to the hypothetical employment of central 
strategic forces.”93 He proposed that instead of following the long- 
adopted plan of massive, strategic response, the United States 
should respond to Soviet aggression by selectively attacking mili­
tary targets. One writer has commented critically that “flexible 
response” has replaced “deterrence of nuclear war by assured de­
struction” as the cornerstone of our strategic policy.94
It has been asserted that the new7 “flexible response” posture is 
antithetical to the stable state of mutual deterrence formally recog­
nized in the ABM Treaty. Herbert Scoville, Jr., former Assistant 
Director of ACDA for Science and Technology, has written: “the 
basic goal of our strategic policy for 20 years finally had a stable, 
more permanent foundation . . . but the ink w7as hardly dry on the 
[ABM] Treaty before the Administration raised questions about 
the desirability of a strategic policy based solely on deterrence.”95 
He concludes: “making it easier to fight strategic nuclear war does 
not truly enhance deterrence and only increases the risk that fears 
of nuclear devastation will turn into reality.”96
It is conceivable that the re-targeting proposal was made only 
for Soviet consumption in order to strengthen the hand of the 
United States at SALT II. However, if the Administration is seri­
ous about re-targeting missiles or reducing the “firebreak” between 
full-scale nuclear and conventional war, then the level of minimum 
stable deterrent must be increased substantially.
90. Supra, note 70.
91. “Soviet Fires MIRV Into Mid-Pacific,” N.Y. Times, January 29, 1974, at 1, 
col. 5.
92. Id.
93. Scoville, “Flexible Madness,” Spring 1974 Foreign Policy, Number 14, at 
164. a ' ^
94. Id. :  ^ ;
95. Id. at 165. ■ * ■ ■ ' $ • •
96. Id. at 177. ^  *
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Of course, it is possible that a decision has already been 
reached by the Administration to mollify domestic critics by achiev­
ing simple and permanent numeric parity of ICBM’s and SLBM’s 
on each side in SALT II without making any further efforts to­
ward control or disarmament. In fact, parity may not be an un­
desirable long-term state if reached gradually and if accompanied 
by adequate control and force reductions; but to adopt parity re­
gardless of cost, simply to lessen certain domestic pressures, would 
be wrong.
The Violations Debate
Substantial U.S. public attention has been directed toward 
alleged violations of the SALT I agreements by the Soviet Union. 
One author has isolated twelve distinct charges against the 
U.S.S.R.97 It should come as little surprise to those familiar with the 
Soviet view of “strict construction” of international agreements 
to learn that their interpretation seems to ignore the “spirit” of the 
agreement as recognized and defined by the United States.
A major source of charges of violations are the seven Amer­
ican “Unilateral Statements.” Of course the statements are “unila­
teral” because the Soviets would not agree to them. Unfortunately, 
however, Soviet acquiescence was carelessly presumed and many 
U.S. officials read the statements as if they were part of the agree­
ment. At this point it is clear that the failure of the Soviets to agree 
to the subject matter of the unilateral statements was probably 
more important in determining the scope of SALT I than the fact 
of the issuance of the statements by the United States. It will be ob­
served that the actions subsequent to SALT I illustrate as much a 
failure of U.S. arms control technique as they do direct violations 
by the Soviet Union.98
Five categories of violations appear to be most important. 
First, under the ABM treaty the U.S.S.R. has been charged with 
testing non-ABM elements “in an ABM mode.” Although the term 
“in an ABM mode” was defined by the U.S. in Unilateral Statement 
(E),99 no mutually agreeable definition was reached. Nevertheless, 
the Soviet tests of SA-2 and SA-5 missiles and radar at altitudes 
in excess of 100,000 feet make a very strong case for a charge of
97. Gray, supra, note 66, at 28; other writers have found five major issues to be 
involved in the violations discussion, see, “Is the Kremlin Cheating,” Neiusuieek 
(Int’l Edition), Dec. 22, 1975, at 9.
98. Gray, id., at 29.
99. Unilateral Statement (E), supra, note 18.
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violation of the uin an ABM mode” limitation under almost any con­
ceivable definition from a technological standpoint. If the facts 
are true as alleged, then reasonable ground appears to exist to 
support a charge of violation.100 Another example of Soviet re­
fusal to accept the “spirit” of SALT I is the testing of “transport­
able” radar units while maintaining that they are not operational 
as “mobile units” which are proscribed by the treaty.
The second major category of allegations concerns interfer­
ence writh “national means of verification.” 101 The electronic 
equipment used by the United States to monitor ABM and SAM 
tests has allegedly been jammed on various occasions.102 In addi­
tion reports have been made that the Soviets have tested a laser 
mechanism capable of temporarily blinding U.S. reconnaissance 
satellites. The Soviets maintain that the United States has no right 
to spy on innocent activities; however, a strong case could and 
should be made that only through open reconnaissance and veri­
fication can either side assure that activities are actually innocent.
The third major category of asserted violations, generally 
related to the verification problems outlined previously, is the 
use of large covers over several missile and submarine construc­
tion sites. Thus far the U.S. intelligence community has regarded 
the action more as a nuisance than a significant impediment to 
verification.103 Recognizing that sheltering or covering of work 
areas is also practiced by the United States, it becomes clear that a 
definition of permissible covering is required in future arms con­
trol agreements.
A fourth category of charges concerns new deployment of 
launchers. Particularly important is the construction of 150 addi­
tional ICBM silos which the Soviets have claimed to be command 
and control centers.104 The striking similarity to launch silos has 
been of great concern to the United States and may develop into 
a major barrier in SALT II.
An example of both the weakness of unilateral statements 
and the failure of the Soviets to recognize the “spirit” of SALT
I is the testing of SS-X-16 land-mobile ICBM launchers. Unilat­
100. See Gray, supra, note 66, at 30. It should be noted that the testing was 
discontinued when the United States protested. It has been reported that the 
Soviets stopped only because they were caught, which should not excuse a viola­
tion, Newsweek, supra, note 97, at 9.
101. Art. XII(2), ABM Treaty, supra, note 17. '
102. Gary, supra, note 66, at 30. ■ ,
103. Newsweek, supra, note 97, at 9. '
104. Id.\ see also Gary, supra, note 66, at 31. (■
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eral Statement (B) expresses the U.S. opinion that deployment of 
land-mobile ICBM launchers is “inconsistent with the objectives of 
[the Interim] Agreement.” 105 In fact the U.S.S.R. agreed to noth­
ing in SALT I regarding land-mobile ICBM launchers.
The fifth major category of allegations, which was readily fore­
seeable in SALT I, concerns the meaning of “heavy” and “light” 
missiles and the permissible expansion in size of existing missile 
silos.
In SALT I there was no agreement on the meaning of “light” 
or “heavy” missiles even though the United States, in Unilateral 
Statement (D) 106 and private notice to the U.S.S.R.,107 attempted to 
implant a definition into the “spirit” of the agreement. One as­
serted violation is the substitution of SS-19 for SS-11 missiles. 
Through the combination of Agreed Interpretation (J) and Com­
mon Understanding (A) ,108 agreement was reached on a fifteen 
percent maximum limitation on expansion of “present dimensions 
of land-based ICBM silo launchers.” A fifteen percent increase 
in either depth or diameter represents nearly a thirty percent in­
crease in volume of the silo structure, and a fifteen percent increase 
in both dimensions can produce a silo having a fifty percent larger 
volume.109 Accordingly, the substitution of the large SS-19 for the 
SS-11 appears only to offend the U.S. “spirit” of SALT and not the 
letter of the agreement. The U.S. negotiators are attributed with 
the belief that only one silo dimension could be changed; however, 
the language of their agreed terms is to the contrary.
Fortunately the Interim Agreement has provided a five-year 
laboratory model in the intricacies of SALT negotiation, inter­
pretation, and enforcement. Three lessons should have been 
learned by the United States: 1) unilateral statements are danger­
ously soothing to U.S. domestic assessment of an agreement, and 
more importantly, of no value in Soviet interpretation; 2) lan­
guage must be definite and precise or no agreement should be 
reached at all; and 3) clearly defined provisions for securing the 
integrity of vital verification means must be achieved, since the 
entire agreement may be rendered useless and even dangerous by
105. Unilateral Statement (B), supra, note 18.
106. Unilateral Statement (D)y supra, note 18.
107. See text associated with note 66, supra.
108. Agreed Interpretation (J) and Common Understanding (A), supra, note 
18.
109. Gary, supra, note 66, at 33; see also the statement by Melvin Laird that 
the SS-19 is 50 percent larger than the SS-11, Int’l Herald Trib. (Paris), supra, 
note 66.
a failure in verification capability. With this reality in mind we 
will attempt to set out certain limited proposals which we feel would 
be useful in developing a responsible United States position on 
SALT II.
IV. T echnological Aspects of SALT II
Our proposals for SALT II are both verifiable and politically 
feasible. We believe that restraint, control, and eventual diminution 
of MIRV should be the overriding goal of SALT 11. Our major 
proposals encompass three areas: first, a reduction in the pace of 
MIRV development, accomplished through a test limitation on all 
missile systems, coupled with an eventual freeze on delivery vehicle 
size; second, a phased transition toward zero land-based ICBM’s 
and 1500 sea-based SLBM’s through the use of adjusted percent 
factors on a yearly basis; and third, an effort to protect submarine 
integrity through unlimited SLBM range and certain limitations 
relating to anti-submarine w'arfare.
Along with advocating the development of the B-l bomber 
and the Trident submarine, we will discuss, without at this time 
proposing its unverifiable deployment, the feasibility of a missile 
self-destruct mechanism. The problem of the rapidly expanding 
deployment of tactical (or theatre) nuclear weapons will also be 
addressed.
The essential nature of an arms control agreement is political, 
but the subjects of the agreement and the means of its verification 
are predominantly technical in nature. There are three particular 
categories of technical definition, termed the technological “trip­
tych” of disarmament and control: first, the zone which is subject 
to control; second, the types of arms, equipment, and installations 
subject to control; and third, the system of verification, inspection, 
and control.110 The problem of verification is basic to all agree­
ments regardless of the choices made in the remaining definitional 
categories.
There are three major verification alternatives open to the 
arms controller. First is the affirmative choice of no verification at 
all. Although in certain limited areas control might be in the self­
interest of each party to such an extent that verification would be 
unnecessary—e.g., the agreement banning the development or use 
of biological weapons,111—this alternative is generally viewed as a
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politically impotent one, at least when serious weapons systems are 
the subject of control. And although the “no verification” alterna­
tive is the simplest and the least expensive, it will not provide the 
degree of mutual assurance required of a SALT II agreement.
On-site inspection and other territorially intrusive modalities 
comprise the second verification alternative. Such verification 
could be either adversary or third-party. A chief asset of direct 
verification is its reliability. The nature of intrusion may vary 
from an unmanned “black box” which transmits radio frequency 
data carrying information based upon several selective parameters, 
to direct on-site inspection of warheads, missiles, and production 
facilities. Over the course of many attempts by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to reach arms control agreements, on-site 
inspection has been an insurmountable barrier almost always pre­
venting agreement. This was a major factor in the failure of the 
Baruch Plan.112 During the period between 1958 and 1960 several 
versions of the Irish anti-proliferation proposal in the United Na­
tions were opposed by the United States because of the omission of 
verification, but the U.S.S.R. would have opposed any draft which 
included the only reliable type of verification available in 1960, 
on-site inspection.113 Herbert Scoville, speaking to the requirement 
of on-site inspection in control of MIRV, noted that “such inspec­
tion would almost certainly not be acceptable to the U.S.S.R. [but] 
if the Soviets required similar inspection . . .  it is doubtful that the 
U.S. could accept it.” 114
At SALT I the Soviets strenuously opposed on-site in­
spection----- partly because of an aversion to exposing their level of
technology, partly because they wished to avoid disclosure of 
targeting information, and partly because of the fear that such a 
departure from past policy might undermine the effectiveness of 
their opposition as a matter of principle to intrusive intervention 
affecting sovereignty.115 As mentioned above, less intrusive but still 
direct verification could be accomplished by unmanned “black 
boxes” located on the territory of the inspected party. Problems of 
servicing, tampering, reliability, and the limited scope of monitora­
ble parameters have combined to defeat the use of such means.
112. E. Firmage, supra note 75, at 713.
113. Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation at 35 (1973).
114. Scoville, testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Interna­
tional Law, and Organization of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 116 
Cong. Rec. 12357 (April 20, 1970).
115. J. Newhouse, supra, note 38, at 180.
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High-level overflight at altitudes of about 70,000 feet would 
also provide a means of direct verification, but this tech­
nique—somewhat irrationally distinguished from satellite reconais- 
sance, perhaps initially because of the presence of a human 
pilot—has taken on the negative connotation of a threat to 
sovereignty. The Eisenhower Administration proposed the “open- 
skies agreement” in 1955, without success. Although overflight has 
been used, for example, in the Gary Powers incident of 1960 and 
over Cuba in 1962, it remains a highly unsettling and dangerous 
means of observation. Thus, although verification by direct means 
remains the most assuring and most reliable, the likelihood of a 
major SALT term relying upon it is extremely remote.
The third verification alternative has been called “national 
technical means,” and comprises monitoring systems which do not 
require formal116 on-site inspection. One highly advantageous 
form of such verfication is the orbital earth satellite. Other systems 
include land-based radar and ""ship-based tracking sensors. Of 
course, national technical means also includes intelligence gleaned 
from newspaper accounts, radio broadcasts, economic factors, pub­
lic displays, and countless other sources. However, radar and satel­
lites clearly represent the major technological advances that made 
national technical means sufficiently reliable to form the founda­
tion for verification in SALT I.
Although precise technical data is not available on the reso­
lution that may be obtained with existing reconnaissance satel­
lites, certain upper limit parameters are known; and these permit a 
rough estimate of capabilities. For example, it is known that be­
cause of electromagnetic properties in the atmosphere, satellite 
sensors are limited to the three spectral regions which will allow 
penetration of the atmosphere. The three regions are visible light 
wavelengths, a broad infrared band, and particular radar- 
frequency wavelengths.117 The most meaningful measure of satel­
lite performance is “ground resolution” G, as represented by the 
equation G=A/300 FR, where A is the altitude, F is the camera 
focal length in feet, and R is the combined resolution of the film 
and optics in lines per millimeter.118 In general terms ground 
resolution indicates the dimensions of the smallest object which can
116. “National technical means” may be considered to include techniques of 
espionage which may encompass contact within the target territorial state.
117. T. Greenwood, “Reconnaissance and Arms Control,” Scientific A m erican , 
February 1973, at 14.
118. Id. , ................. S
be seen on the ground with good contrast. The most difficult fac­
tor to ascertain, owing to security, is the optical component of the 
resolution factor R. The optical component is a function of the 
wavelength of the light used and the aperture size of the camera. A 
camera aperture of five feet, however, is not unreasonable for use 
with visible light wavelengths and orbital pay-load capabilities. 
Given present film technology and a lens aperture of about five 
feet, a conservative resolution factor would be 180 lines per mil­
limeter. A common satellite perigee (nearest point) is about 100 
miles and the United States Air Force has disclosed the practicabil­
ity of a focal length of 20 feet. Accordingly, a conservative estimate 
of ideal ground resolution would be 0.7 feet. In other words, an 
object with dimensions greater than 0.7 feet could be seen with 
adequate contrast.
Of course, many sporadic weather and electromagnetic factors 
may cause the ground resolution to deteriorate at times to some­
thing lower than the ideal 0.7 feet. On the other hand, some ex­
tended objects such as rail lines can be identified even though they 
are dimensionally too small to yield good contrast.119
At present, the highest resolution systems require actual re­
trieval of the exposed film through the use of a recoverable reentry 
capsule. Electronic transmission by television or facsimile is only 
useful for lower quality photo reconnaissance systems. Develop­
mental trends indicate, however, that all-electronic surveillance sys­
tems are possible in the future.
United States satellites are typically launched in near-polar 
90-minute orbits with a perigee of 100 miles. A parking orbit of 
22,300 miles, where the satellite can remain in synchronous move­
ment with the earth, would be more desirable; but the ground 
resolution, G, suffers substantially when A is increased from 100 to 
22,300. For long-term area survelliance, however, the parking orbit 
may be desirable if coupled with lower level periodic satellites that 
could provide a “closer look” when necessary.
Recent charges of Soviet “blinding” of U.S. satellites through 
use of a laser system constitute a source of major concern; however, 
technological experts have indicated that a redesign of the optical 
systems in the satellites will transcend the problem for the time 
being. In view of the pace of technological development in the 
highly important area of satellite reconnaissance, and the alterna­
tive consequences of several years of weapons development
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without restraints, it would seem reasonable to agree to an arms 
limitation term which may be only marginally observable today in 
reliance upon an increasing ability to observe future activity. The 
high level of reliance upon satellite verification produces a cor­
respondingly high level duty on each side to preserve the in­
tegrity of verification by restraining technology which degrades 
verification. When either side has the power substantially to 
deny verification by the other side, the core of any agreement 
is sacrificed.
A second important component of “national technical means” 
is land and sea-based radar. Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar rep­
resents an additional technological advance, together with satellite 
observation systems. Unlike conventional line-of-sight radar, OTH 
radar is not restricted in its range by the curvature of the earth. By 
reflection from the ionosphere, OTH radar can detect objects at 
great distances, making possible the detection of missiles soon after 
they are launched.120 A set of unique distinguishing ionospheric 
disturbance characteristics have been developed using OTH radar 
enabling the United States to identify each type of Soviet missile 
upon launch by its “signature.” Accordingly, it is possible to discern 
precisely which element of the Soviet arsenal is being tested or 
otherwise launched and also to detect the use of a modified or 
previously unknown device.
As a result of large electromagnetic and other physical fluctua­
tions in the ionosphere, OTH radar is necessarily imprecise in 
determining trajectories and ballistic information. However, once it 
has succeeded in alerting a nation of a launching and identifying, 
by “signature,” the type of vehicle being employed, highly accurate, 
line-of-sight radar may then be poised to track the vehicle as soon 
as it breaks the horizon.
Shipboard radar has also proven a valuable tool in tracking the 
terminal stage of missile or warhead trajectories. United States 
ships have monitored the terminal phases of Soviet missile tests 
in the Pacific since 1961. The Pacific observations have given 
the intelligence community a clear picture of Soviet qualitative 
capability. Airborne radar and photography have also proven to be 
a valuable concomitant of Pacific Ocean reconnaissance op­
erations.121 ,
One additional and essential element in any of the verification 
systems discussed is the large scale digital computer. Myriad facts,
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statistics, and electronic data signals must be quickly and accurately 
resolved into a humanly perceptible and technically meaningful 
form. The computer plays an ever increasing role in identifying, at 
real-time, the nature of a supposed threatened attack. Even though 
the threat posed by an accidental launch is immense, the im­
mediately available information offered by a real-time system is 
available to corroborate any “hot-line” notice and to aid in the 
formulation of a suitable political or military response.
The heart of the ABM systems presendy developed is a mas­
sive digital computer. The kind of tracking, calculation, and gui­
dance response required for a mid-air intercept with high prob­
ability of destruction is super-human and presses state-of-the-art 
limitations in digital systems. Also, by making destruction of a 
submarine a rising probability function upon reverse-trajectory cal­
culation after a single missile launch, the real-time computer sys­
tem coupled with radar or passive sonar arrays constitutes one of 
the few known potential threats to the efficiency of the SLBM 
fleet.122 (Of course a submarine still remains virtually invulnerable 
prior to that first firing.)
It is important to remain aware of the more pedestrian aspects 
of verification, such as radio broadcasts and economic data. These 
societal factors, when coupled with reconnaissance by satellite, 
radar, or sonar and when resolved to useful information by a large 
scale computer system, bring the state of verifiable activity to a 
rather high level. Verification is no longer as substantial a hurdle 
in arms control agreements as it once was. National verification 
means were endorsed in SALT I, and will probably prove to be 
sufficiently reliable to support a SALT II agreement.
A second element of the “triptych” of disarmament and con­
trol following verification is the determination of the types of 
weapon systems to be controlled. The “qualitative” system that is 
most visibly and probably most immediately destabilizing is MIRV. 
MIRV was often related to SALT I in the literature but was only 
indirectly discussed in the formal negotiations. The most signifi­
cant decision on MIRV to emerge from SALT I was the decision to 
reach no agreement at all.
For a single warhead ICBM, the impact location is a pre­
determined function of the ballistic path followed by the missile. 
MIRV, however, employs a post-boost control system (PBCS) which
122. See Kuenne, The Polaris Missile Strike, 114-16 (1966). The author ex­
amines the probability of detection after successive launches and determines it to 
be a rising function.
is capable of re-orienting the final warhead-carrying stage, called a 
“bus,” in order to alter substantially the ballistic path of the “bus” 
and associated warheads. The MIRV system accomplishes inde­
pendent targeting for separate warheads by selectively and gently 
releasing successive warheads from the “bus” and then, between 
warhead releases, redirecting the ballistic pathway of the entire 
“bus.” Upon release from the “bus,” the warhead proceeds along 
the same ballistic path as that followed by the entire “bus” at the 
moment of release. Accordingly, by changing the direction or 
speed of travel of the “bus” between each successive warhead re­
lease, each warhead will be directed toward a different target area 
or, alternatively, will arrive at the same target area but, because of 
the use of differing trajectories, at a different time.123 It is believed 
that individual warheads may be targeted for impact at points 
separated by distances of as much as a few hundred miles or a 
given percent of the distance covered by the trajectory of the entire 
missile-bus assembly.124
The increased number of independently targetable warheads 
does not come without a cost in terms of deliverable payload. The 
post-boost control system and other parts of the bus structure ob­
viously occupy volume and weight which is not productive in terms 
of explosive yield. Some design trade-off factors are the desired 
target separation (determinative of the amount of fuel required for 
mid-course bus reorientation), the number of warheads carried, 
overall range of the system, ABM penetration aids, and yield of the 
individual warheads.
The generally accepted ratio of yields in single warhead sys­
tems compared with a MIRV system is about 3 or 2 to 1. For 
example, the single warhead versions of Minuteman had yields 
estimated at one to two megatons; but Minuteman III is believed to 
employ three MIRV warheads of only 200 kilotons each.125
As outlined above, the more meaningful comparison of MIRV 
with single warhead systems is in the area of “first strike destructive 
capability”. The area of destruction at a given yield increases with 
increasing yield by approximately the two-thirds power.126 There­
fore, an increase in yield does not result in an equivalent increase 
in area of destruction. Thus, doubling the yield would increase the
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area of damage by only 60 percent. Of course, the two-thirds 
power factor is only a rough approximation since the susceptibility 
of the area to blast effects and the height of the detonation above 
the ground must also be considered in estimating the area of de­
struction. Clearly, however, a mere increase in yield will not au­
tomatically result in an equal increase in destructive potential.
Recognizing that damage is not so much a factor of yield as of 
targeting accuracy, one may conclude that the yield to yield trade­
off between MIRV gnd non-MIRV warheads may operate to in­
crease the area of destruction even though a MIRV system would 
be of a lower total yield. It has been found that three 190 kiloton 
MIRV warheads (570 kilotons total) may destroy the same area as a 
single one-megaton warhead; thus the non-MIRV warhead re­
quires nearly twice the yield. In like manner, twenty-four 100 KT 
MIRV warheads (2.4 MT total) will destroy the same area as a single 
25 MT warhead.127
V. Proposals for SALT II
Four areas of concern will demand thfe attention of the parties 
to SALT II: MIRV, SLBM, accidental or unreasoned attack, and 
control of manned bomber aircraft. The purpose of the foregoing 
discussion of the increased destructive capability offered by un­
limited MIRV deployment was to form a foundation for the asser­
tion that some type of control of MIRV or diminution of its threat 
is mandated under any meaningful approach to ending or signif­
icantly lessening the arms race. The United States had success­
fully tested the MIRV system in 1970 and, during SALT I, was in 
the process of deploying it in Polaris and Minuteman missiles.
While the United States favored a freeze on further develop­
ment, it was unwilling to eliminate the system, even if elimination 
were possible and even if it could have been verified by acceptable 
means (both of which possibilities were highly unlikely), since the 
Soviet Union by then possessed massive throw weight and quantita­
tive advantages.
As a result of a counterbalance having been set up between the 
Soviet lead in numbers and throw weight in land-based ICBM’s 
and the American advantage in MIRV technology and deploy­
ment, an inextricable connection has arisen between the two types 
of superiorities, such that the elimination of one must be accom­
plished in tandem with the diminution of the other. We propose a 
two-step approach to limiting the technological arms race resulting
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from MIRV development. Additionally, we propose a means by 
which the “counterforce” character of MIRV in the opposing arse­
nal can be substantially eliminated. These proposals are interde­
pendent, and we do not advocate any single element independent 
of the other major elements.
At the outset we should point out that we have ruled out any 
direct numerical limitation upon deployed MIRV warheads. This 
presumption is based on the belief that neither side would accept 
such an agreement because of the present difficulties in verifying 
compliance.128 As the first step in our approach to limiting the perils 
of further MIRV development, we believe that a partial ban on the 
testing of all missile systems should be imposed.
A total ban on flight testing of MIRV systems is widely advo­
cated, but a major problem in achieving meaningful agreement on 
any total ban in the arms control area is presented when one side 
has fully developed the subject system and the other side has not. 
In the present context, it would seem highly improbable that any 
of the proposed total testing bans would be agreeable to either side 
and particularly to the Soviets with respect to MIRV.129 Another 
substantial factor weighing against a total ban directed only toward 
MIRV testing is the possibility for clandestine testing by using one 
warhead at a time on a MIRV system; because of this procedure 
the ban would be essentially unverifiable.
The type of limited testing ban which we propose is addressed 
to all tests of missile systems. There would be allowed each year a 
specified number of tests of any system which the testing party 
wished to select, including MIRV and launchings necessary to 
maintain confidence in systems already deployed.130 An annual 
limitation of 20 launches w'ould be most effective in reducing sub­
stantially the pace of development of all missile systems, including 
MIRV, without encouraging clandestine activity.131 Particularly
128. It seems clear that an agreement limiting the number of MIRV warheads 
could only be verified, under present technology, by on-site inspection either of 
inventories or of deployed missiles. (It should be noted, however, that the Soviet 
Union has agreed “in principle” to on-site inspection of peaceful nuclear tests, a 
far less demanding intrusion than on-site inspections of weapons systems; see 
supra note 36.)
129. Secretary Kissinger’s congressional briefing on SALT I indicated an ex­
change of proposals on MIRV, wherein the Soviet Union ruled out any total 
testing ban on MIRV. Supra, note 62.
130. See B. Feld, “Current Developments and Dangers of Atomic Arma­
ments,” Science and Public Affairs: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1972, at 17. 
The author proposes, in general terms, a limit similar to the instant proposal.
131. H. York, “Controlling the Qualitative Arms Race,” Science and Public Af­
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when coupled with the other proposals made here, the action to 
reduce the pace of development would be desirable and would 
support the effectiveness of those proposals.
The second proposal directed primarily toward MIRV is an 
eventual freeze on the physical size of delivery vehicles or silo 
structures. A more precise definition of “heavy” and “light” mis­
siles should be made and dimensional characteristics of each type 
should be frozen after the agreement has been in effect a number 
of years, e.g. , eight to ten years. Until that time dimensional limits 
should be established which would allow the United States the op­
tion of increasing missile sizes to match those deployed by the 
Soviet Union. Any increase in size by the USSR should be prohib­
ited or limited to a small percentage. The direct result of this 
proposal would be to allow each side to deploy MIRV, but presum­
ably only to the level of optimum effectiveness for present Soviet 
payload capacity and missile sizes. The trade-off, with respect to 
destructive capacity, between yield and number of warheads, cou­
pled with target “hardness” factors, places an upper optimum limit 
on the number of independent warheads for a given delivery ve­
hicle size.132 Of course, technological advancement in fuels, cold 
launch techniques, and post boost control systems would alter the 
optimum number of warheads; nevertheless such advancement 
would probably occur rather slowly and would therefore be com­
patible with the instant MIRV proposals aimed at slowing the pace 
of development while maintaining the goal of general parity dur­
ing the course of the agreement.
The Soviet Union’s present superiority in payload capability 
would make the freeze disadvantageous to the United States if it 
chose not to enlarge missile sizes during the pre-freeze period, 
but the operation of the testing limitation should tend to offset any 
temporary Soviet advantage in payload capability by aiding the 
preservation of America’s superior technological position. We
fairs: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1973, at 5. York proposes a limit of 20 
or 30 test firings each year when a ban is directed toward all systems.
132. Several factors combine to determine the optimum number of MIRV 
warheads per launch vehicle. The most significant factor is the lower limit of yield 
imposed upon each warhead to overcome the “hardness” of a target. Also, the 
more warheads used, the greater the non-productive weight of the PBCS bus (in 
terms of yield). Accordingly, it is not conceivable that either side will use an 
unlimited number of warheads of very small yield in the face of larger and larger 
losses in payload efficiency owing to the bus fuel and structure. See I. Bellany, 
“MIRV’s and the Strategic Balance” 226 Nature, 412, (May 2, 1970), for a discus­
sion of optimum numbers of warheads prior to the freeze on the number of 
delivery vehicles.
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again note that this second proposal is inextricably connected with 
the accomplishment of agreements in the other areas covered by 
these proposals, particularly the shift in reliance from land-based 
systems, to be discussed below, since that defense element is most 
threatened by mere increases in number of deliverable w7arheads.
To summarize, our plan for the verifiable reduction in the 
pace of development of MIRV as opposed to an unverifiable ban 
on MIRV, will ultimately result in the full, though slower, de­
ployment of MIRV systems on both sides. The testing limita­
tion is readily verifiable through the use of OTH radar and ship­
board radar, and both the testing limitations and the freeze on 
the physical size of delivery vehicles and silo structure are also 
verifiable through satellite reconnaissance owing to the nature of 
ground activity which would be observable if there were serious 
violations.
Our third related proposal directed toward the elimination of 
the counter-force threat posed by MIRV is a plan for the gradual 
phaseout of land-based ICBM systems, in conjunction with an 
overall gradual reduction in the total number of nuclear arma­
ments. Statistical analysis of warhead numbers, yields, and ac­
curacies, shows that under present trends of technological de­
velopment, land-based ICBM sytems are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable and more destabilizing because of the convincing 
“launch on warning” rationale attached to their effective use.133 
(The cancellation of the United States proposed Hardrock silo 
hardening program illustrates a recognition of the limits of passive 
protection in the face of MIRV accuracy.) On the other hand, any
133. See E. Luttwak, “The Strategic Balance 1972”, The Washington Papers No. 
3, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. See also, 
M. Kaplan, SALT: Problems and Prospectives 81-82 (1973).
R. Beavers in “SALT I,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974, at 
214, concludes that “the number of ‘large modern’ missiles which the Soviet 
Union can deploy was frozen, but at a level which is probably too high to save 
Minuteman if the Soviets MIRV their huge SS-9 ICBM’s.”
The Department of Defense has discussed a possibility of “fratricidal” interfer­
ence between exploding and incoming warheads when individual silos are 
targeted, which interference would somewhat reduce the one-on-one analysis of 
the counterforce capability of MIRV. However, Secretary Schlesinger has con­
ceded that MIRV could destroy many Minuteman missiles in their silos. NA. 
Times, June 20, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
On Dec. 3, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that with or without 
SALT, “I would think that the land-based missiles on both sides are going to 
become increasingly vulnerable.” Int’l Herald Trib. (Paris), April 29, 1975, at
3, col. 7.
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sudden movement to eliminate all land-based ICBM’s would be 
unacceptable to both parties and destabilizing.
A movement toward submarine-launched missiles would tend 
to increase stability because of their present and foreseeable invul­
nerability. Additionally, the transition period from ICBM’s to 
SLBM’s would present a prime opportunity to reduce total num­
bers of launchers on both sides while actually increasing the level 
of second-strike survivability.
The phased reduction and transition toward SLBM’s should 
be accomplished by applying a yearly percentage calculated annu­
ally on the basis of then existing levels, SLBM’s being related to a 
total absolute number on the order of 1500.134 For example, based 
upon maximums originally established in SALT I, if the chosen 
percentage used were 10%, in the first year the United States would 
be obligated to reduce ICBM systems by 106 (1054 x 10%) and 
permitted to increase SLBM’s by 79 ((1500 — 710) x 10%). The 
Soviet Union would be required to reduce ICBM’s by 162 (1618 x 
10%) and would be permitted to increase SLBM’s by 55 ((1500 — 950) 
x 10%). Given a constant percentage, each year the reduction of 
ICBM’s and increase in SLBM’s would become smaller in absolute 
numbers. For example, during the second j'ear the United States 
would lose 95 ICBM’s ((1054 — 106) x 10%) and gain 71 SLBM’s 
((1500 — 710 — 79) x 10%). The Soviet Union would lose 146 
ICBM’s ((1618 -  162) x 10%) and gain 50 SLBM’s ((1500 -  950 -  
55) x 10%).
Eventually—over several years—the force levels of the two 
parties would reach zero ICBM’s and 1500 SLBM’s. No long-term 
allowance has been made for the differing geographical factors in 
submarine deployment by the United States and Soviet Union, 
which factors would presently justify some disparity in favor of the 
Soviet Union. It is believed the disadvantages will eventually be 
overcome by the Soviet Union through longer range missiles, 
which will substantially increase the “on station” area of the ocean 
and thereby increase the percentage of “on station” forces. Any 
temporary disparities in deployment patterns or other differences 
between the parties could be balanced equitably by applying differ­
ing reduction and transition percentages, while maintaining long­
term numeric equality----- for example, by applying a flat 10% fac­
tor to the United States and mixed 8% ICBM, 12% SLBM factors
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to the Soviet Union. Regardless of the factors used, in time both 
parties would reach the same number of SLBM systems.
The long-term limit of 1500 SLBM’s was chosen rather arbi­
trarily in order to reach an overall reduction from present day 
combined forces and still allow both parties substantial increases in 
SLBM launchers. The overall reduction should be acceptable to 
most domestic and foreign interests since significant increases in 
first-strike survivability will be achieved through the transition 
from land to sea.
Specific implementing provisions regarding verification of 
abandoned sites will need to be reached. One acceptable method 
would be to require complete demolition of abandoned silos, neces­
sitating a substantial amount of observable earth-moving activity 
to reactive the site.
It should be recognized that these three interrelated “MIRV” 
proposals are completely and presently verifiable and contain sig­
nificant elements of self-interest on both sides. Although the pro­
posals do not eliminate MIRV, they decelerate its development and 
make MIRV less advantageous as a counterforce system, thereby 
reducing its long-term destabilizing effect. Additionally, while satis­
fying the “parity camps” on both sides, the agreement would still 
maintain present “sufficiency” by mechanistically accommodating 
short-term disadvantages through the proper selection of percen­
tage factors.135
Another newly-developed re-entry system is MARV (termi­
nally guided Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle).136 Although the 
ABM penetratability of MARV is not as appealing in view of the 
ABM Treaty, its development has continued. It is our belief that 
our proposals with respect to MIRV are equally applicable to 
MARV.
Over time both parties to SALT have been placing an increas­
ing reliance upon SLBM invulnerability as they assess their nuclear 
postures. The time will come when the stability of the nuclear
135. Nations have generally been reluctant to forego even highly obsolete and 
useless systems. In this case the land-based ICBM phase-out will unfortunately 
disturb the balance of interservice rivalries. Although it is a severe indictment to 
assume that such factors are relevant, they are real political considerations for the 
executive branch. The same problems are observable in the hierarchy of the 
Soviet Union. See B. Feld, “ASW—the ABM of the 1970’s?,” 7 Stan.  J. I n t l .  
S tud ies  89 (1972). See also statement by Henry A. Kissinger, N.Y. l  imes, July 4, 
1974, at 1, col. 8, expressing the need for restraint by the military establishment.
136. A brief discussion of the operation of MARV is found in B. Carter, Nu­
clear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,” Scientific American, May 1974, at 20.
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balance will be at the mercy of continued SLBM invulnerability. 
The proposals set out in this paper will operate to increase reliance 
upon the SLBM and its relatively invulnerable nature. Accordingly, 
we propose a two-part accord to protect further the integrity of 
submarine forces. The first part of the proposal is to permit un­
limited increases in the range of SLBM delivery vehicles. Each 
increase in SLBM range opens substantially more “on station” area 
in the oceans of the earth. The direct result of opening more “on 
station” area is to enhance invulnerability because the probability 
of detection decreases. It has been estimated that the increase in 
range obtained by the replacement of the Polaris with Trident 
system, having a range of 2880 miles, will increase the “on station” 
area of the ocean by more than a factor of ten. Similar results will 
occur on the Soviet side with the deployment of the SS-N-8, a 
3000-mile range SLBM.137 Accordingly, continued development 
and deployment of the long-range Trident Submarine System 
along with the Polaris/Poseidon upgrade plan should be pursued.
The second part of our SLBM proposal is directed toward anti­
submarine warfare (ASW) activity. It is generally conceded that 
state-of-the-art ASW capability represents an extremely remote 
threat to SLBM submarines. Anti-submarine warfare activities 
comprise five major categories: intelligence, detection, localization, 
tracking, and destruction. Each category presents peculiar tech­
nological problems, and extensive research is being conducted by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union in all areas.138 Any 
agreement which can retard or halt the pace of the development of 
ASW would operate to extend and enhance materially the con­
tinued invulnerability of the SLBM Submarine. Accordingly, it 
would seem to be an excellent time to reach an agreement regard­
ing limitations on ASW development and, particularly, deploy­
ment.
An agreement on ASW should, at a minimum, prevent the 
installation or use of any active or passive underwater detection 
array for purposes other than protection of the immediate area 
surrounding sea-going vessels in established shipping lanes. In ad­
137. Supra, note 70, at 65.
138. Supra, note 131, at 6; see also, R. Garvin, “Antisubmarine Warfare and 
National Security,” Scientific American, July 1972, at 14; R. Beavers, supra note 133, 
at 216., points out that even knowledgeable critics of SLBM’s do not foresee any 
prospect of nullification for the next two decades. Beavers asserts that the ABM 
Treaty substantially enhanced SLBM effectiveness by removing the nullification 
prospects for incoming missiles.
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dition, the agreement should designate a large zone of the ocean as 
a sanctuary in which no form of underwater detection equipment 
could be used except for immediate area navigation. In the alterna­
tive, two large areas could be designated—one to each party—in 
which the non-designated party could not employ any type of 
military equipment, including surface vessels or hunter-killer 
submarines.139 Although verification of under-surface activity 
would be difficult, the “total ban” provision would make a single 
detected unauthorized event a violation of the terms of the agree­
ment and would thereby strengthen verification reliability.
It should also be recognized that many claims of ASW tech­
nology are based upon “laboratory models” and that in actual op­
eration the claimed system capabilities have been shown to be 
greatly over-rated. The opacity, vastness, and noise levels of the 
ocean still represent significant strengths for the strategic sub­
marine. At the present and in the forseeable future, SLBM sub­
marines are not in any danger of detection in more than very 
limited numbers;140 but the potential threat to security posed by a 
sudden advancement in ASW is still a matter which deserves care­
ful attention.
Thus, the combined objectives of our proposals on MIRV and 
SLBM are five-fold: to increase deterrent stability, to achieve polit­
ically desirable parity, to phase out obsolete and increasingly pro­
vocative land-based systems, to enhance the invulnerability of sub­
marine systems, and to reduce overall force levels.
A third area demanding the attention of both parties to SALT
II is the problem of accidental or unreasoned attack by any country 
having control of nuclear weapons. Even the most limited probabil­
ity of an accident may seem exceedingly real when the scenario 
could find an American President notifying the Kremlin that an 
unrecallable warhead is on a trajectory toward Kiev, with its 
10,509,000 inhabitants. The second widely noted scenario is a 
threatened or actual attack by an Nth country with perhaps only 
a few delivery vehicles, but capable of reaching New York, Los
139. See B. Feld, supra note 135, at 94 where the second alternative is set out 
more fully. See also H. York, supra note 131, at 8.
140. R. Garvin, “Antisubmarine Warfare and National Security,” Scientific 
American, July 1972, at 14. An example of detection problems is the difficulty 
encountered by the United Stales in obtaining information on Soviet Delta class 
submarines deployed in the Barents Sea, thereby escaping the U.S. monitoring 
gap between Britain and Iceland. This instance is also an example of more in­
vulnerability owing to extended range SLBM missiles (4,800 miles for D-Class 
SLBMs). Int’l Herald Trib. (Paris), April 29, 1975, supra, note 133.
Angeles, or Kiev. Even such limited capacity would serve to hold 
the world hostage to almost any demand. The test of a nuclear ex­
plosive by India on May 25, 1974, points out the urgency of some 
means of assurance and international control over the develop­
ment and use of nuclear power. The “Nth” country scenario pre­
sents substantial international economic and political repercus­
sions.141
Although the probability of the occurrence of these events is 
low, the consequences would be so dire that far more serious 
thought must be given to their prevention. However, since the 
ABM debate was settled in SALT I and since the technological 
deficiencies of both “thick” and “thin” ABM systems have been 
disclosed, we are reluctant to propose the construction of a “thin” 
system to meet the accidental launching or Nth country problems. 
Although a “thin” ABM may technologically solve those prob­
lems,142 political reasons would probably prevent agreement on 
such a system from being reached at SALT II.
Nonetheless, serious debate might have to begin again over the 
desirability of allowing both superpowers a thin missile defense 
system. Such a system may be the only modality, short of nuclear 
disarmament, that can accomplish a meaningful hedge against war 
by mistake or miscalculation or against war initiated by a secondary 
nuclear state and catalytically affecting the superpowers. If the 
system were sufficiently thin, it would not generate an offense- 
defense arms race nor render a first strike more plausible. At this 
particular time, we can no more afford the sacred cows of the left 
(e.g. , opposition to ABM regardless of the nature of the particular 
system) than we can endure the icons of the right (e.g. , eternal 
attachment to the defense triad—bombers, ICBM’s, and SLBM’s 
—without regard to its paternity or necessity).
A limited measure of protection against accidents, though not 
against Nth country launching, could be provided by agreement to 
develop and apply complex coded communication systems within 
each warhead or delivery vehicle, which systems could either de­
stroy or deactivate the warhead after launch. Such a mechanism 
would, of course, meet serious resistance from the military on the 
ground that we would face possible nullification of our defense 
systems to possible impotence upon discovery if another party dis­
covered the nature of the electronic medium employed. Opposi­
tion to a deactivation system should be tempered, however, by
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141. E. Firmage, supra note 75.
142. See Kahn, “The Case for a Thin System,” Why ABM at 73 (1969)
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statistical-technological considerations of the parameters of the 
problem. With the availability of thousands of discreet radio fre­
quencies and modulation schemes in multiple combinations and 
with the additional availability of an infinite number of pulse code 
configurations, coupled with the added security protection of last- 
second coding of the warhead “safety lock” prior to launching, it 
would seem extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any target 
nation to successfully base its defense system upon electronic deac­
tivation. An explosive destruct mechanism has been used success­
fully by NASA and has averted potential disasters. The NASA 
system does not seem to have been a source of technical failure or 
unusual risk. The “coded lock” of a strategic system would add 
complexity, but only of a minimal nature when compared with 
present guidance, control, and launch electronics.
We do not embody the coded destruct system in a formal 
proposal because it falls beyond the limits of national means of 
verification, the criterion we established to test all of our concrete 
proposals, and because it would require on-site inspection.143 Al­
though such a “fail-safe” system could be, in many respects, as 
advantageous to the party whose missile was accidentally launched 
as to the target nation, in order to insure greatest security for both 
parties, mutual deployment of a destruct mechanism should be a 
provision in an arms control agreement. Although the presently 
deployed Minuteman firing program contains several interlocking 
controls in the firing and inhibition systems, that alone should not 
preclude us from considering the establishment of a further tier of 
safety controls over that, most critical period immediately subse­
quent to launch.
A final topic of concern in SALT II is the control of manned 
bomber aircraft and cruise missiles. Some American officials have 
claimed that the disparity in allowable force levels under the In­
terim Agreement was in deference to United States superiority in 
the manned bomber component,144 but a more convincing ratio­
nale is that agreement on bombers simply was not reached. A most 
important technical obstacle to control of manned aircraft is the 
ready convertibility of virtually any high-performance transport
143. The fact that al the Moscow Summit the Soviets agreed in principle to 
on-site inspection may make it possible eventually to reach such an agreement. See 
supra note 36.
144. The United States now has 455 long-range B-52 bombers while the Soviet 
Union has 140 long-range TU-95 “Bear” and MYA-4 “Bison” bombers. Supra, 
note 70, at 66. ,
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or heavy fighter to strategic nuclear roles. While the generally 
larger radar cross-section of jet transports would render them more 
vulnerable to air defenses than well-designed bombers, the differ­
ence could be small.145
Long-range bombers were lumped with long-range missiles in 
that provision of the Vladivostok agreement which placed a ceiling 
(2400) upon strategic-weapon delivery vehicles possessed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. It should be noted, however, 
that bombers are suited for many roles, conventional and nuclear; 
they are relatively slow in reaching a target, and are nearly impos­
sible to control or verify because of the conversion problem out­
lined above. Most importantly, bombers are flexible and recallable 
under state of the art command and control mechanisms. Given 
the present early warning technology, the bomber force is also 
relatively invulnerable to sudden attack.146 We therefore advocate 
the adoption and further development of the B-l bomber program 
in the United States in order to enhance strategic options in the 
safe and effective area of manned bombers. The manned strategic 
bomber may constitute a significant element in the “flexible re­
sponse” policy first outlined during the Nixon Administration.147
Control of the cruise missile,148 like the manned bomber, is 
nearly impossible to verify owing to a dual tactical and strategic role 
and ready convertibility of conventional to nuclear capability. The 
major counter-force threat posed by the cruise missile is its accura­
cy, although the radar penetration features are not insignificant. 
The development of the cruise missile only accelerates the obso­
lescence of land-based systems as an element of the strategic arsenal. 
Except for a general arms control interest in reducing the absolute 
number of all types of nuclear systems, strategic and tactical, the
145. E. Luttwak, supra note 133, at 65.
146. J. Newhouse, supra, note 38, at 201.
147. See H. Scoville, supra note 94.
148. The cruise missile is a slow, low-flying, unmanned aircraft powered by 
an efficient fan-jet engine and guided the entire distance to the target. The 
guidance mechanism provides two alternatives, either the missile can utilize a 
terrain-matching computer together with real-time radar images or it may be 
guided remotely by external commands which are relayed by space satellite. The 
missile is capable of flight at 300 feet while navigating around buildings or ir­
regular terrain features, thereby totally escaping detection by known radar sys­
tems. The estimated range is 2,000 miles and the missile may be launched by air­
craft (twenty missiles per B-52), from almost any ship, or from submarines 
(through standard twenty-one inch torpedo tubes), “Two Stoppers in SALT,” 
Newsweek (Int’l. Edition), Nov. 24, 1975, at 10.
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cruise missile represents approximately the same destablizing 
influence as MIRV and MARV, furthermore its development 
strongly supports our proposed shift in reliance from land-based 
systems.
Both cruise missiles and manned bombers have been used in 
SALT II negotiations as negotiable elements;149 however, final 
agreement on their control would be unverifiable and probably 
unacceptable politically.
Land-mobile systems were not included in. SALT I in any 
meaningful manner. The practical conflict between concealment 
of the systems to enhance invulnerability and the exercise of non­
concealment requirements for verification is a major and poten­
tially insurmountable barrier to any agreement short of total 
forbearance. The land-mobile system is only slightly less vulner­
able than fixed systems, and should be considered a land-based 
system with reference to our proposals.
■ —  SALT II—Collateral Issues
Completing this analysis of SALT II, we turn our attention to 
the final element of the “triptych” of disarmament and control, the 
zone subject to control. Dictated somewhat by circumstance, SALT 
I was not concerned with arms control in Europe or any other 
“forward” location. SALT II should, however, encompass the 
European theatre to the extent of strengthening the Mutual Force 
Reductions talks (MFR) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty re­
view.150
An issue which is separate from bomber control, but still re­
lated, is Forward-Based Systems (FBS). FBS is concerned princi­
pally with the stationing by the United States of manned bomber 
forces in continental Europe, on carriers in the Mediterranean, 
and in the northeast Pacific. There are about 600 FBS aircraft in
149. Id.; see also, Int’l Herald Trib. (Paris), June 17, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
150. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was subject to review on March 5, 1975, 
under the terms of Article VIII, Section 3, which requires a review at the end of 
five years after the treaty enters into force. The treaty entered into force on 
March 5, 1970. See, 7 International Legal Materials 815, July 1968; E. Firmage, The 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 711 
(1969). The final report of the review was adopted on May 30, 1975, “Final Docu­
ment of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera­
tion of Nuclear W7eapons,” NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 1; 14 Int’l. Legal Mate­
rials 1061 (1975). The next review conference will probably be in 1980 (see review 
report under Art. VIII). _
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Europe alone.151 Yet, the Vladivostok agreement did not include 
within the weapons constituting the ceiling upon strategic-weapon 
delivery vehicles NATO’s foreward-based weapons capable of strik­
ing the Soviet heartland. Because the integrity and unity of NATO 
are directly involved in any discussion of European FBS aircraft, 
the United States should agree to submit European-related FBS to 
the MFR negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO 
countries. It is believed that an agreement to submit FBS to the 
Mutual Force Reductions Conference would be viewed by the 
Soviet Union as a desirable concession and would thus aid in 
achieving other more important points sought by the United States, 
particularly the testing limitation as it relates to MIRV and the 
eventual elimination of land-based ICBM’s. As French and British 
forces grow to a level sufficient for European security, the United 
States should find it justifiable and politically acceptable to recall 
part of our FBS components in Europe and the European area.152
In recent years a quiet trend has emerged toward expanded 
deployment and further dissemination of low-yield nuclear devices, 
euphemistically called tactical (or theatre) nuclear weapons (TNW). 
One writer has referred to the invisible undefined growth as “arms 
without doctrine.” 153 Presently, the major area of our deployment 
of TNW is in Europe under NATO. Approximately 7,000 TNW 
warheads are deployed in the European theatre.154 The weapons 
range in yield from less than one kiloton to twenty KT. The de­
ployment comprises several categories of weaponry, from artillery 
shells with a range of ten miles to surface-to-surface missiles with a 
range of 25 to 460 miles (“Honest John” and “Sergeant”). In addi­
tion, small yield nuclear weapons carried by tactical aircraft and 
ships are considered to be TNW .155 The TNW potential of the 
Warsaw Pact is believed to be of approximately the same level as 
that of NATO, with perhaps fewer warheads of greater average 
yield.
In testimony before the Joint Atomic Energy Subcommittee, 
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, then Supreme Allied Commander
151. J. Newhouse, supra note 38, at 175.
152. For an analysis of French and British capability, see W. Joshua and W. 
Hahn, “Nuclear Politics: America, France and- Britain”, The Washington Papers, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies at 22-26 (1973).
153. W. Heisenberg, “Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear 
Weapons,” The Adelphi Papers, No. 96, IISS London (1973) at I.
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id.
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in Europe, sought significant expansion in the development of 
TNW in Europe under NATO .156 The proposed expansion would 
be in the area of very small yield weapons, less than one KT, of a 
newer “clean” technology. In the course of his testimony, General 
Goodpaster conceded the substantial danger of collateral damage 
and fallout that exists in using the presently deployed generation 
of more “unclean” TNW artillery shells.
The proposed expansion—if not intended solely as a “bargain­
ing chip” for Soviet consumption—seems to constitute a hazardous 
course of deployment. Again, we might point out that TNW is 
coupled closely with NATO security and should be a subject for 
consideration in the Mutual Force Reductions talks.
American bombing in Vietnam demonstrated the highly de­
veloped state of technology in television guidance and other 
“smart” conventional weapons. These weapons would seem to be as 
effective as TNW7 for many unhardened targets, such as bridges 
and dams. In addition, the use of small nuclear devices for civil 
engineering has not proven as advantageous as once envisioned 
under the “plowshare” program .157 The TNW issue, however, is 
not a simple one. Some targets, for example tanks and submarines, 
are sufficiently hardened that a TNW artillery shell or torpedo 
finds little substitute in the conventional sphere. A point of real 
opposition to TNW is that it unnecessarily reduces the emotional 
“firebreak” between conventional and nuclear war. A small 
number of writers, however, argue the reverse by asserting that 
TNW may actually be a stronger deterrent than large missiles since 
their use is more conceivable and therefore more feared.158 
Nevertheless, technological development of conventional arma­
ments diminishes the force of this argument.
The Mutual Force Reductions Conference offers an opportu­
nity for the West to discuss TNW7 and FBS under more favorable 
conditions than those at SALT. But if a measure of intention and 
comparison could be reached at SALT, chances for mutual reduc­
tion of NATO and Warsaw nuclear weapons would be 
enhanced.159 ' ■ s ,
Finally, an agreement between the United States and the
156. N.Y. Times, January 27, 1974, Sect. 3, at 2, col. 3.
157. See B. Spinrad, “Where Are W7e? On War and Peace and NPT and 
Safeguards,” Science and Public Affairs: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1974, 
at 35.
158. Id. at 36. ’A * * * -
159. VV. Heisenberg, supra, note 153 at 33.
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Soviet Union regarding nuclear arms necessarily concerns the en­
tire globe and, to become effective, must take on global dimen­
sions. It is becoming increasingly clear that China intends to be­
come a superpower.160 Thus China must be brought into the arms 
control dialogue as soon as possible, perhaps, first, at the Confer­
ence of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and, later, if 
necessary, in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the nu­
clear states. Chinese nuclear strategy will most surely become an 
increasingly important factor in Soviet decisions at SALT II and, to 
a lesser extent, will influence United States policy as well.
VI. Conclusion
The Vladivostok agreement accomplishes for the first time a 
quantitative ceiling upon the deployment of strategic-weapon de­
livery vehicles. The further limitation upon the numbers of these 
vehicles that may be equipped with qualitative improvements in 
size, throw weight, and multiple warheads places a mild and indi­
rect qualitative restraint upon the arm race as well. Both the quan­
titative and qualitative prohibitions, however, could be 
strengthened substantially by the reduction and eventual elimina­
tion of land-based ICBM’s and the retardation of MIRV as a 
counter-force, first-strike weapon. ~
We have suggested three major, interdependent areas of arms 
control endeavor. First, we propose two steps to reduce the pace of 
development of MIRV: a test limitation on all missile systems and 
an eventual freeze on delivery vehicle size. Second, the threat of 
MIRV and other qualitative developments as counter-force 
weapons may be eliminated by adopting a long-term phased transi­
tion toward zero land-based ICBM’s and 1500 sea-based SLBM’s 
through the medium of adjusted annual percentage factors. The 
third set of primary proposals is directed toward the maintenance 
of SLBM integrity through missile range increases and certain re­
strictions on anti-submarine warfare activities. We advocate the 
continuation of programs to increase SLBM range, and thereby to 
enlarge potential “on station” ocean areas, and we also suggest two 
possible means for retarding the growth of destabilizing anti­
submarine capability.
It is proposed that strategic stability and versatility are fur­
thered by the continuation of the B-l and Trident programs in the
160. See H. Gelber, “Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy,” Adelphi Papers, 
No. 99, IISS, London (1973).
United States. The applicability of a missile self-destruct mech­
anism to our present and future defense systems has also been 
examined although not embodied specifically in a proposal.
A major change in United States policy has apparently oc­
curred since the conclusion of SALT I. The shift began quietly 
with a rhetorical question in the President’s foreign policy state­
ment of February 18, 1970: “should a President, in the event of a 
nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass 
destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it 
would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?” 161 The 
central issue is the desirability of a return to the strategic doctrine 
of ‘'flexible response.” It is our belief that the President should 
have the option of striking a single military installation through the 
use of manned bomber forces or selective SLBM’s. In line with our 
proposals for SALT II and the mutual force reduction talks, wre 
suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union be denied the 
option of using tactical nuclear weapons at the battlefield level 
where advanced conventional weapons are nearly as effective. The 
President should, however, have the flexibility under the Single 
Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) to retarget certain missiles for 
an optional set of military or industrial centers. Of course, in view 
of our hypothesis regarding the increasing instability and obsoles­
cence of ICBM’s, the new operating plan would apply only to 
SLBM’s and manned bombers.
It is recognized that long-time proponents of a triad in U.S. 
forces—bombers, ICBM’s, and SLBM’s—will react negatively to 
these proposals. However, we believe that to pay homage to the 
triad doctrine when one of its major components is increasingly 
destabilizing is to invite disaster.
The likelihood of a massive Soviet nuclear strike upon the 
United States is now widely perceived as being exceedingly small. 
However, the possibility of a limited “surgical” attack in reprisal for 
some other political or military act, as unthinkable as that may be, 
is as likely as any other hostile and intentional use of a nuclear 
weapon. In view of our proposal for phased reduction of increas­
ingly obsolete land-based ICBM’s, the cost in terms of stability for 
the military/industrial targeting option is reduced. It is not herein 
proposed that the “firebreak” between nuclear and conventional 
war be reduced, but the President’s question with respect to nu­
clear options demands serious consideration. Clearly, if military
266 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [14:2
161. President’s Foreign Policy Statement, 116 Cong. Rec. at 3838 (February
18, 1970). . .
response is mandated, the policy of the United States should be to 
respond first with conventional weapons, when at all possible; but 
if, as a last resort, the “firebreak” is to be breached, that breach 
should occur at a level necessitating less than the complete destruc­
tion of two continents.
For too long, the world’s major powers, particularly the United 
States and the Soviet Union, have, it would seem, erred in arms 
control negotiations on the side of overcaution in their attempts to 
restrain and direct technology with law. In actuality, such a course 
has been neither cautious nor conservative, for the values sought to 
be protected have been placed in a position of remarkable vulnera­
bility. Yet the obvious has been overlooked: some risk is involved in 
reaching arms control agreements that attempt to restrain a tech­
nology whose end can never be perceived; but the result of a tech­
nological race unrestrained by legal agreements, even imperfect 
ones, is foreseeable and presents a far worse spectre.
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